Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson said Tuesday that if the U.S. Supreme Court sides with Arizona in a capital case over whether a death row inmate was properly denied post-conviction relief, the ruling could give states a roadmap for defying the high court's criminal law decisions.
During oral arguments, Justice Jackson noted the high court made clear in the 1994 case Simmons v. South Carolina that when a capital defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, defendants are entitled to inform the jury they will be ineligible for parole if not sentenced to death, and in 2016 in Lynch v. Arizona , the Supreme Court enforced the Simmons decision. But the state hasn't followed those rulings.
If the Supreme Court accepts Arizona's interpretation of its criminal procedure rule on post-conviction relief, no one convicted in the state between 1994 and 2016 will get the benefit of Simmons, Justice Jackson said.
"That is a little troubling because why couldn't another state do the same thing with respect to a criminal law rule ... of this court that they don't like," she said.
In November 2021, John Montenegro Cruz, who was sentenced to death in 2005 for murdering a police officer in 2003, petitioned the Supreme Court to review his case, arguing the state of Arizona wrongly denied him the right to inform a jury that he was ineligible for parole if given a life sentence. The state abolished parole in 1994.
In February, the Arizona attorney general's office opposed high court review of the case, contending Cruz wasn't eligible for post-conviction relief because he didn't request at his trial that the jury be instructed he was ineligible for parole.
The following month, the justices agreed to review the case on the limited question of whether the Arizona Supreme Court correctly concluded Cruz was ineligible for post-conviction relief because a "significant change in law" hadn't occurred since his original conviction.
On Tuesday, the justices questioned the state's argument that Cruz hadn't met its prerequisite under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(g) that a "significant change in law" must take place for him to be eligible for post-conviction relief.
Justice Elena Kagan said the fact that defendants in Arizona couldn't invoke their right to a jury instruction about parole ineligibility until after the high court's 2016 ruling in Lynch is "as big a change of law that there is."
"It sounds like a significant change," she said.
In response to Justice Kagan's point, Arizona attorney general's office chief deputy Joseph Kanefield argued it wasn't a "significant change," but a misinterpretation of law.
Justice Jackson then asked Kanefield to define what he considered to be a "significant change in law."
Kanefield responded a "significant change in law" has to be a "clear break from the past" or a "transformative event."
"It has to be a rare occurrence where the rules actually change," he said.
Justice Amy Coney Barrett said the state's distinction between a "significant change in law" and a misinterpretation of law "seems like hair-splitting."
"It seems kind of artificial, and as I understand it, the novelty of it is you hadn't had it before," Justice Barrett said. "This was an extension of the law, extension of interpreting [Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure] 32.1(g)."
In an email to Law360, Kanefield said he was "pleased" with oral arguments and that the justices clearly understood the state's position.
"The petitioner was never deprived of his ability to request a parole ineligibility jury instruction at his trial in 2005, and we are confident the justices will determine that the Arizona Supreme Court's holding below was independent and adequate under the court's precedent to support its judgment denying the petitioner's request for untimely post-conviction relief," he said.
Neal Katyal, who argued on behalf of Cruz before the Supreme Court, declined to comment.
Cruz is represented by Jon M. Sands, Cary Sandman and Cory Gordon of the Federal Public Defender for the District of Arizona, and Neal K. Katyal and William E. Havemann of Hogan Lovells.
The state of Arizona is represented by Mark Brnovich, Joseph A. Kanefield, Brunn W. Roysden III and Jeffrey L. Sparks of the Office of the Arizona Attorney General.
The case is John Montenegro Cruz v. Arizona, case number 21-846, in the Supreme Court of the United States.
--Editing by Lakshna Mehta.
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